MORE ON ARISTOTLE *DE ANIMA* 414a 4–14

ROGER A. SHINER

ARISTOTLE IS ONE of those philosophers who are remarkably sensitive to subtle similarities and contrasts between different aspects of reality; he is well aware that careful attention to detail is mandatory for the descriptive metaphysician.[1] In cases where a commentator accuses Aristotle of confusion in his argument, we should therefore always be prepared for the possibility that the accusation is mistaken, because the commentator does not possess the same sensitivity and awareness. Ross, in commenting on *De Anima* 414a 4–14, accuses Aristotle of becoming "entangled in the coils of his own logic."[2] Professor Rosamund Kent Sprague, in her valuable paper "Aristotle, *De Anima* 414a 4–14,"[3] brings out clearly that there is more going on in this passage than Ross seems to realize, and that a blunt charge of confusion will not do. Her main point is that ψυχή has two distinguishable aspects, not one only, and that Aristotle is concerned to allude to both here; Ross charges Aristotle with confusion because he has overlooked this duality. It seems to me that Professor Sprague has seen the way in which the passage in question should be handled. I am not, however, altogether happy about every detail of her account, and the purpose of this paper is to discuss the passage further.

I

It seems clear that in this passage Aristotle is using a very complex analogy. Two interpretative questions are central. (*i*) What exactly is the analogy being offered? (*ii*) Is it the analogy itself that lacks coherence, or is it rather the attempts of previous commentators to explain it? The analogy contains nine elements:

(1) ᾧ ζῶμεν καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα
(2) ᾧ ἐπιστάμεθα
(3) ᾧ ὑγιαίνομεν
(4) ψυχή
(5)
(6) ἐπιστήμη
(7)
(8) ὑγίεια
(9) μόριόν τι τοῦ σώματος ἢ καὶ ὅλον

[1] I have benefited during the writing of this paper from discussion with Mr. G. A. Spangler.

[2] Aristotle, *De Anima*, edited by W. D. Ross (Oxford 1961) 220.

[3] *Phoenix* 21 (1967) 102–107.

PHOENIX, Vol. 24 (1970) 1.

These nine terms are split up into three sets of three elements each, viz., (1, 4, 5), (2, 6, 7), and (3, 8, 9); analogous relations are said to hold between the corresponding members of each of these sets. The full analogy is therefore [(1:4)::(2:6)::(3:8)]&[(1:5)::(2:7)::(3:9)]& [(4:5)::(6:7)::(8:9)]. I have not specified terms (5) and (7) because there is more to be said about their identity than Professor Sprague has seen. In the list given above, "(1), (2), (3)" correspond to her "I, II, III"; "(4), (6), (8)" are her "(a) terms"; "(5), (7), (9)" are her "(b) terms." This new symbolism has been adopted in order to make it quite clear that elements (1), (2), (3) (= I, II, III) belong to the analogy, and that it is not just the six "(a)" and "(b)" terms and the relations between them that concern us.

The first problem is to fill in the blanks, in so far as this can be done without begging questions of general interpretation. With respect to (5), Professor Sprague identifies it as "what possesses the potentiality of having a soul (i.e., body)" (104). She adds in a footnote that "the two senses of 'body' in [(5)] and [(9)] are not the same. In [(5)] Aristotle means body as apt to receive form, and in [(9)] he means the composite animal. But no particular confusion results from this difference" (104, note 4). (5) is the only element in the analogy that Aristotle does not explicitly mention, so we have to infer it from what he does say. It will have to be whatever plays in the set (1, 4, 5) the role of (7) and (9) in the sets (2, 6, 7) and (3, 8, 9) respectively. The answer seems to be *σῶμα* of some kind or other, but we have to be careful what kind we specify. Aristotle's own characterisation is given a few lines earlier, *σῶμα φυσικὸν δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχον* (412a 27–28). The point to notice here is that, if we seek to fit the soul/body distinction into Aristotle's general form/matter distinction, we have to notice a dissimilarity between this case and the case of, for example, a bronze statue.[4] The bronze has a separate existence as a lump of metal before the sculptor starts work on it. "Body" is found, however, only as an element in the constitution of living things; it is only *qua* part of a living thing that body can be seen as *δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχον*. There is no Great Artificer putting together parts drawn from stock and then breathing life upon them.[5]

All of this seems implied by Professor Sprague's "body as apt to receive form," but it may profit us to spell it out. It is not certain, however, that this entitles us to say, as she does, that because (5) is "body as apt to receive form," (5) and (9) are therefore different, that (9) is a composite living thing. Aristotle's remarks at *De Anima* 408b 25 ff. and 412b 15 ff. emphasize that only living things have souls, and only they have a

[4]See also Professor Sprague's salutary remarks in "The Four Causes; Aristotle's Exposition and Ours," *The Monist* 52 (1968) 298–300.

[5]Cf. G. E. M. Anscombe, *Three Philosophers* (Oxford 1963) 54–58.

specific kind of σῶμα, namely, a σῶμα φυσικὸν δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχον; but there is no mention of the notion that a living thing, rather than a σῶμα φυσικὸν δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχον, is the δεκτικόν of soul. Element (9), as much as element (5), is to be understood as "body as apt to receive form." The phrase μόριόν τι τοῦ σώματος ἢ καὶ ὅλον, which describes element (9), can be explained more precisely as follows. Health (in its primary sense) can only be ascribed to living things, and so the body, or a part of it, is only ᾧ ὑγιαίνομεν *qua* the body, or a part of the body, of a living thing. So we, as composite living animals, may be described as healthy in virtue of our bodies, or the parts of our bodies. In such circumstances, our bodies, *qua* the bodies of living things, receive health; we are healthy in virtue of the reception by our bodies of health.

We must, however, be careful not to contrast a living thing and its body more sharply than is proper. Aristotle does speak of τὸ ὑποκείμενον as τὸ ἐκ μορφῆς καὶ ὕλης (cf. *Metaph.* Z 1029a 2–5), and in our passage he implies (414a 14) that (5), (7), and (9) merit the characterisation ὕλη καὶ ὑποκείμενον. Aristotle is frequently accused of conflating *compositum* and ὑποκείμενον; it might therefore be thought that this issue could be relevantly pursued here. It represents, however, a complicated amalgam of interpretative[6] and philosophical[7] questions which would take us too far afield. In any case, it does not affect the difference of opinion between Professor Sprague and myself, for we both want to read Aristotle as here distinguishing the two terms, even though she wants to say (9) is *compositum* and not ὑποκείμενον, and I want to say it is ὑποκείμενον and not *compositum*.

Some general lines of interpretation have now been established for the terms (5), (7), and (9); (7) must be considered in more detail. In a case where we can be correctly described as knowing in the full sense, that is, exercising knowledge, this is because our soul, in its role as πρώτη ἐντελέχεια, is capable of knowing in an active sense; it would then be said that an ἐνέργεια has been received by its δεκτικόν, the soul. Once again, however, it is *we* who know, though in virtue of our soul, or rather, a part of it, τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν. Our soul gives us the ἕξις necessary for the exercise of knowledge; without it we could not exercise knowledge. Our exercising knowledge comes about through the actualising of our disposition to know. There is a similar tendency here too to say that the person, and not the soul, is that which receives knowledge, for it is only when belonging to a particular living person, that the soul is the ἕξις which is necessary for the ἐνέργεια of knowing. But a similar distinction to that drawn

[6]E.g., how clearly overall does he distinguish them? How far is his distinguishing them (or not distinguishing them, as the case may be) consistent with his general philosophical system?

[7]E.g., should he in point of metaphysical fact distinguish them?

earlier in the case of health must be made between the fact that *we* know, and the fact that such-and-such are the causes of our knowing.

We can, then, complete the list of elements as follows:

(5) *σῶμα φυσικὸν δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχον.*
(7) *ψυχή* (specifically *τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν*).

This gives us a set of nine terms and the postulated relationships between them; the next and separable problem is the coherence of the analogy involving those terms and relationships. To this I shall now turn.

II

In this section, I want to discuss a possible substantiation of Ross' charge that Professor Sprague does not mention, not only for its own sake, but also because it will help to clarify further the basic structure of the analogy. The point concerns the sort of "priority" which, for Aristotle, is involved in the relationships between certain elements of the analogy. The priority which relates elements in the sets (2, 6, 7) and (3, 8, 9) is, as the text reads, that priority which a *μορφὴ καὶ εἶδός τι καὶ λόγος* has over a corresponding *δεκτικόν*. The text also claims that the soul is *ᾧ ζῶμεν καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα καὶ διανοούμεθα πρώτως* (414a 12–13), for which reason it is also *λόγος τις καὶ εἶδος*. Now, what sort of priority does Aristotle have in mind when he uses *πρώτως* at 414a 12–13? Is it a priority which preserves or destroys the desired analogy? There is one obviously attractive possibility, namely, that here Aristotle is picking up his earlier description of the soul as *πρώτη ἐντελέχεια* (412a 27), and means by *πρώτως* no more and no less than he meant by *πρώτη* there. I have claimed that the priority in this first set of terms (1, 4, and 5) is the same as in the other two. That leaves two points to consider. Is the "priority" of *πρώτη ἐντελέχεια* this priority or not? If it is not, can it be shown that Aristotle does not have the priority of *πρώτη ἐντελέχεια* in mind in our passage?

It cannot be denied that Aristotle says in various places that the soul is an *εἶδος* (e.g., 412a 20, as well as in our passage). He must therefore think of the soul as having that kind of priority which goes with being an *εἶδος*. Further, in so far as he refers to the soul as an *ἐντελέχεια*, he has just that priority in mind there too. The use of *πρώτη*, however, at 412a 27 indicates that the soul is essentially responsible for *ἕξεις* in that which has as a part the *δεκτικόν* of *ἕξεις* and not something which is essentially responsible for *ἐνέργειαι* in that which has as a part the *δεκτικόν* of *ἐνέργειαι*. The difference is marked on the grounds that the *ἕξις* exists in a given individual earlier in time than the *ἐνέργεια*; the soul, as essentially responsible for the *ἕξεις*, is therefore *πρώτη ἐντελέχεια*.

This being so, *πρώτη* does not seem to carry at all the idea of priority in

definition or substance, although, as Aristotle himself notes (*Metaph.* Θ, 1049b 19 ff.), the whole question of priority in time is a good deal more complex. This may make it clear that, if Aristotle intends πρώτως at 414a 13 purely and simply to echo the πρώτη of his earlier definition of soul, then his analogy is incoherent. It also, surely, makes it just as clear that Aristotle cannot simply mean this at all. For a start, in our passage, it is because the soul is ᾧ ζῶμεν πρώτως that it is an εἶδος; πρώτως plays a role in the licensing of the inference. In 412a 6 ff. on the other hand it is because the soul is ἐντελέχεια σώματος φυσικοῦ that it is an εἶδος; πρώτη in πρώτη ἐντελέχεια plays *no* role in the licensing of *that* inference. Secondly, Aristotle is not in our passage talking about what happens in specific individuals, but is generalizing about the nature of soul. Why, then, read into Aristotle what would be an indefensible remark for him to make, when, on another interpretation, his argument is sound? The soul is that ᾧ ζῶμεν πρώτως; i.e., in the matter of living, it is prior to σῶμα φυσικὸν τοίονδε, although both may be described as ᾧ ζῶμεν; it is that by which we actually, and not just potentially, have life. It is λόγος τις καὶ εἶδος and not ὕλη καὶ ὑποκείμενον. This approach fails to produce sufficient reason for rejecting the analogy as confused.

III

Now I want to discuss more directly Professor Sprague's analysis of the passage and the arguments she has used to support it.

As noted at the beginning, if Aristotle intends the analogy to be completely coherent, he is committed to the view that (4), (6), and (8) are all cases of μορφὴ καὶ εἶδός τι καὶ λόγος καὶ οἷον ἐνέργεια τοῦ δεκτικοῦ, and also to the view that (5), (7), and (9) are all δεκτικά. Professor Sprague is aware of this, and claims that the analogy is coherent in this respect: "In each case (a) stands for an activity (shape, form, definition) and (b) for a recipient matter" (103). Another recent commentator, Professor Hamlyn, also maintains the symmetry here; he claims that (4), (6), and (8) are all formal causes and (5), (7), and (9) all material causes.[8] There are, however, certain apparent difficulties in this view. First, Aristotle is wont to distinguish between ἐνέργεια, "activity," a dynamic notion, and ἐντελέχεια, "actuality," a static notion. Given this distinction, then, the expression ἐνέργεια τοῦ δεκτικοῦ will not do at all for soul, and the analogy seemingly begins to falter. Secondly, the soul, which is a form, an actuality, can *prima facie* hardly serve as the material cause (Hamlyn) or potentiality for the possession of knowledge (Sprague 107).

With respect to the first of these points, some care in refuting it is

[8] *Aristotle's De Anima Books II and III*, translated with introduction and notes by D. W. Hamlyn (Oxford 1968) 90–91.

needed, for it is true that Aristotle does make a distinction along these lines. It should be noticed, however, that *twice* within a short space (412a 10, 412a 22) Aristotle has already distinguished the possession of knowledge and the exercise of knowledge as two kinds of ἐντελέχεια. Although *Metaphysics* Θ 1050a 22 explicitly distinguishes ἐνέργεια and ἐντελέχεια, Ross remarks that "for the most part Aristotle treats the two words as synonyms" (*De Anima* 166). It seems, therefore, that we should not jump too readily to the conclusion that, beneath the two different labels of ἐνέργεια and ἐντελέχεια, there lies a difference of substance sufficient to controvert the analogy.[9]

The fact that Aristotle is not rigorous in his separation of ἐνέργεια and ἐντελέχεια suggests that he sees in them some underlying unity which is of (at least) comparable significance to the difference he sees between them when he wants to distinguish them. The feature which unites them I take to be their role in the definition of τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. If we ask τί ἐστίν; the correct answer will be, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. We may then go on to distinguish a case where we give the definition of the appropriate ἐνέργεια, when τί ἐστίν; is asked of a thing whose essence is an ἐνέργεια, and a case where we give the definition of an ἐντελέχεια, when τί ἐστίν; is asked of a thing whose essence is an ἐντελέχεια. The point then might be raised, why does Aristotle not coin some third word for whatever it is that unites ἐνέργεια and ἐντελέχεια, and formally regard these two as species of this third thing, instead of misleading us by using ἐντελέχεια both as the generic word and as a word for one of the species? It is not clear, however, that Aristotle does split things up quite so neatly, i.e., that there is a genus of actuality with two separate species. It is rather a matter of the same thing, actuality, which sometimes needs to be looked at in two different ways, and sometimes does not; but when it does not, it is the ἐντελέχεια aspect of actuality that is significant. The use of some third term would disguise this.

The question whether we have in the slide from ἐντελέχεια to ἐνέργεια a weakness in the analogy depends on the truth of some such account of actuality as that given above. The more connection there is between ἐνέργεια and ἐντελέχεια the stronger is Aristotle's argument; the less the connection, the weaker the argument. My own view is that there is a close connection between the terms, and further, that it is this connection that is behind the reasoning of our passage. But one cannot be categorical here. As far as concerns Professor Sprague's paper, my point is that she does not deal with the question of possible differences of meaning, and should have. There is room for interpretative flexibility here, which seems to mirror a flexibility in Aristotle's own terminology. I do not wish here and now to claim that my view is correct. One may indeed say that (4),

[9]Cf. Chung-Hwang Chen, "The relation between the Terms ἐνέργεια and ἐντελέχεια in the Philosophy of Aristotle," *CQ* 52 (1968) 12–17.

(6), and (8) are all shapes, forms, or definitions, or that they are all formal causes. But, unless one qualifies such a claim by a discussion such as the foregoing, one may be held to be unaware of certain aspects of the terms ἐνέργεια and ἐντελέχεια.

Let me turn now to the other question raised above (p. 33). Is it acceptable to say that (5), (7), and (9) all stand for a recipient matter or a material cause? One possible answer is to say that of course it is not. The soul is a form, not matter; as such it is actuality and not potentiality. How then can it be a recipient matter, with all that that implies? A further point may even be made. Aristotle says that the δεκτικόν of ἐπιστήμη is τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν, and this means sometimes a complete living thing, sometimes a sense-organ, sometimes the soul or part of it. It may therefore not be the soul that fills slot (7) at all (cf. Hamlyn, p. xviii). If this line of argument begins to be effective, the analogy is under very strong pressure.

An essentially similar countermove is made by both Professors Sprague and Hamlyn. Professor Sprague denies that Aristotle takes the position "once a δεκτικόν, always a δεκτικόν," and avers that "potentiality and actuality are not watertight compartments" (107); Professor Hamlyn remarks that "the distinction between form and matter is a relative one" (90–91). This move assumes that τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν is to be taken as denoting the soul or a part of it, and not the whole living thing. I have argued in section I of this paper that this is legitimate, but more must be said.

There are three relevant remarks by Aristotle:

(*i*) τὸ διανοεῖσθαι οὐκ ἔστιν πάθος τοῦ νοοῦντος, ἀλλὰ τουδὶ τοῦ ἔχοντος ἐκεῖνο, ᾗ ἐκεῖνο ἔχει (408b 25–27).

(*ii*) ἐπιστήμη ἔστιν οἷον ἐνέργεια τοῦ δεκτικοῦ (414a 9–10).

(*iii*) ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι ἡ τῶν ποιητικῶν ἐνέργεια ὑπάρχει (414a 11–12).

Statement (*i*) has to do with a relation between substance and attribute; (*ii*) has to do with form as activity and matter; (*iii*) has to do with form as activity and the particular substance which is active. We may spell these out in a particular case thus: Callias is exercising knowledge, because τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν of Callias' soul has received ἐπιστήμη; the exercise of knowledge, however, belongs to (is exhibited in) Callias. This puts us in the position of committing Aristotle to the view that the soul is a δεκτικόν, but more of that shortly. The alternative is more difficult yet. If we say that Callias, rather than his soul, is the δεκτικόν, and so interpret τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν in 414a 10 and slot (7) as denoting ὁ ψυχὴν ἔχων, Callias, the particular living thing, then we commit Aristotle to thinking that a substance *qua* substance is the material cause, the recipient matter, of its own ἐνέργειαι; to demote in this way an ultimately real particular to the status of potentiality would not be easy to accept.

Let us return to the idea that the soul is the δεκτικόν with respect to

ἐπίστασθαι. The basic problems are two. How can something which is actuality also be potentiality? How can something which is εἶδός τι also be ὕλη? We may first of all point out that Aristotle thought that indeed it could, as this kind of example of ἐνέργεια and ἕξεις occurs not infrequently (cf. *Metaph.* Θ 1048a 32 ff.). But could he *legitimately* think so? I think he could. He warns us in *Metaphysics* Θ.6 that we must expect different cases of actuality and potentiality to be *analogically related* rather than conforming to precisely the same definitions. In this way the paradox in our passage is mitigated. The case of the soul as δεκτικόν for ἐπιστήμη involves a notion of potentiality which Aristotle characterizes as τὸν μὴ θεωροῦντα, ἂν δύνατος ᾖ θεωρῆσαι; the connexion with the "brute" δύναμις of a block of wood lies in the use of δύνατος, but we have in the former case a ἕξις, and not a "brute" δύναμις. The potentiality of a soul which is no more and no less than a πρώτη ἐντελέχεια is a different sort of potentiality: this difference results primarily from the nature of soul, that it is a πρώτη ἐντελέχεια. Similarly, we may mitigate the paradox of associating εἶδος and ὕλη. ὕλη is basically τὸ ἐξ οὗ (cf. *Physics* B 194b 24). If, therefore, we answer "Yes" to the question, "Does it make sense to associate εἶδος and ὕλη?" we are not saying of the soul that it is a piece of matter, a "medium-sized piece of dry goods" (in the late J. L. Austin's celebrated words); that would indeed be paradoxical. We are saying of the soul that it is τὸ ἐξ οὗ, the something-out-of-which. What is the "raw material" (and I use inverted commas advisedly) for Callias' exercise of knowledge? It is his possession of knowledge, his being knowledgeable, a particular faculty that he has. We will not find what Aristotle says here puzzling, if we remember that the fundamental notion is τὸ ἐξ οὗ. Aristotle wants us to understand the matter of a statue as an instance of τὸ ἐξ οὗ, a concept of which there are other materially dissimilar but formally similar instances. We are not to conceive of τὸ ἐξ οὗ as peculiarly that which the piece of wood is to the finished carving. The matter of a statue is one example, but not the paradigmatic example, of a that-out-of-which, and it is doubtful, moreover, whether any example is the paradigmatic example. Not only does our passage teach this lesson; one may cite also Aristotle's notion of ὕλη κινητή (cf. *Metaph.* H 1044b 7). Matter which qualifies a thing for spatial movement cannot be interpreted as a notion exactly equivalent to the matter of a statue, even though one may point to the same piece of the world's furniture as the matter in question in each case. Yet ὕλη κινητή is readily comprehensible as τὸ ἐξ οὗ.

I can now state my quarrel with Professors Sprague and Hamlyn. There is an interpretative puzzle in our passage since Aristotle apparently makes incompatible claims about the nature of soul. But this puzzle is, it seems to me, preserved and not solved by any simple claim that form and matter are relative, or that potentiality and actuality are not water-tight compartments. What is required is a more detailed analysis of the

assumptions involved in a charge like Ross' that Aristotle's reasoning is confused, and a careful consideration of Aristotle's own view of actuality and potentiality. The assumptions in question seem to be two, namely (*i*) that if anything is actuality then it can never in any way be spoken of as potentiality, and (*ii*) that if anything is actuality then it is actuality for a single specific and unvarying reason. Aristotle himself claims that different cases of actuality and potentiality are analogically related. This claim invalidates the two assumptions just mentioned, and some attention to it would have provided Professors Sprague and Hamlyn with the underpinning that their explanation needs. It is not enough merely to name relativity and leaky categories. One must explain how this comes about, and how it meets the sort of criticism Ross wants to make. I hope I have managed to do this.

I want to add here a note concerning Aristotle's parenthetical remark (414a 11–12) about the general categories of action and passion, for it is here that Professor Sprague thinks the machinery of Aristotle's argument creaks. What is the connexion that Aristotle sees between his analogy and this parenthetical remark? He has been explaining how we may talk in two ways about that by which we know/are healthy, one corresponding to form and activity, the other to recipient matter. His reason for introducing the parenthesis seems to be that he wishes to say a little more about the latter case. He points out that, while the exercise of the arts of knowledge and health is in the agent, the teacher or physician, yet those arts could not be manifested if there were no pupils to teach, and no unhealthy patients to heal. Thus the recipient of ἐπιστήμη or ὑγίεια, the pupil's soul, the patient's body, are much more intimately involved in the exercise of knowledge or of health than might superficially appear. The categories of actuality and potentiality lurk behind the remark about action and passion in this way, that, unless there is the exercise of knowledge or actual health, and unless there is the potentiality for the exercise of knowledge or for actual health, there can be no case of τὸ ποιητικόν operating on τὸ πάσχον. I suggest that Aristotle is here reminding us of this. But such a reminder does not seem to involve us in any sort of "stabilising of the relation between λόγος and δεκτικόν" (cf. p. 107 of Professor Sprague's paper) which would cause trouble for the analogy. The parenthesis is no more than a parenthesis, an allusion to another feature of Aristotelian doctrine which sheds a little further light on the nature of the soul.

IV

Now we are able to see whether the argument that Aristotle is putting forward in our passage is at all shaky. I have stated already that I approve of Professor Sprague's general approach, *viz.*, that the purpose

of the passage is to allude to the complexity of ψυχή. The allusion is successfully carried out by discussing distinguishable possible descriptions of certain things, and picking out the role of ψυχή in this procedure. If Aristotle had given us only the example of the set (1, 4, 5), or only the examples of the sets (1, 4, 5) and (3, 8, 9), then we would not have any of the problems which are caused by the introduction of soul in two places in the complete analogy, with the spotlight on a different aspect of soul in each case. But in those circumstances we would have only a *partial* account of the soul. Soul is a distinctive combination of a distinctive kind of actuality, ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικὸν δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος, and a distinctive kind of potentiality, potentiality for ἡ ἐντελέχεια ἡ ὡς τὸ θεωρεῖν λεγόμενον, τὸ ἐπίστασθαι κυρίως λεγόμενον. In order to bring this out, we need *all the examples* which are tersely introduced in 414a 4–14. Since the soul is a complex entity, any account of it will be complex too, and this one is, like so many of Aristotle's philosophical descriptions, both complex and compressed.

In *De Anima* 414a 4–14, Aristotle offers a picture of the soul which indeed needs some enlarging and focusing, before the picture's subject-matter is presented to us with any sharpness and clarity. Professor Sprague finds that, even after dealing with Ross' interpretation of the passage, the blurs cannot all be removed, and she attributes this to Aristotle's inadequate photography, rather than to her own developing and printing. I have tried to argue that most of what is wrong in her analysis is the latter, not the former, though what is wrong is not great in extent. The preceding paper has attempted to make certain adjustments. (*a*) The nature of certain terms in the analogy has been delineated more precisely (section I). (*b*) A putative problem in the passage not treated by Professor Sprague has been discussed (section II). (*c*) Professors Sprague and Hamlyn both imply that we can treat (4), (6), and (8), and (5), (7), and (9) as exactly on a par in each case; this implication has been shown to be misleading, for Aristotle is operating with two kinds of actuality and two kinds of potentiality (section III). But they are both actuality and both potentiality, and that is all that is needed to make the analogy hold. If there is any fuzziness at all, it is caused by the degree to which the differences in each case between the kinds play a role in the determination of the relations between the elements of the analogy; and I do not think they do play such a role to any significant extent. (*d*) The generalization about action and passion does not have the implications that Professor Sprague takes it to have, and thus she has not justified the claim that we have "creaking machinery" at that point in Aristotle's argument (p. 37).

UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA, EDMONTON